

## Message Text

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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ADP-00 OMB-01 AID-20 IO-13 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-07 H-02 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03

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R 100742Z JUL 73

FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4313

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY SANAA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L JIDDA 2863

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINS, IR, SA

SUBJECT: IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT

REF: JIDDA 2619; TEHRAN 4563

SUMMARY: SPARSE INFO AVAILABLE SO FAR INDICATES SAUDIS (PROBABLY KING) DID REITERATE THEIR STANDARD POSITION ON ISLANDS QUESTION IN DISCUSSIONS HERE WITH KHALATBARI. SAQQAF APPARENTLY TRIED IN ADVANCE CONVINCE IRANIAN FONMIN NOT ATTACH TOO MUCH IMPORTANCE THIS ASPECT OF DISCUSSIONS. AMB AND KHALATBARI HAD CHANCE REVIEW VARIOUS ASPECTS OF SAUDI-IRAN TIES BEFORE KHALATBARI'S MEETINGS WITH KING AND OTHERS AT TOP LEVEL. KHALATBARI SAID HE PLANNED GIVE CAREFUL EXPLANATION REASONS FOR IRAN'S REARMING. END SUMMARY.

1. SINCE KHALATBARI'S DEPARTURE I HAVE BEEN ABLE SEE ONLY DEPUTY FONMIN MAS'UD, WHO, I SUSPECT, DID NOT SIT IN ON VERY MANY OF MEETINGS AND WAS ABLE TELL ME ONLY  
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"WE MADE CLEAR OUR REGULAR POSITION" ON ISLANDS QUESTION.

I HOPE GLEAN SOME FURTHER FACTS FROM SAQQAF WHEN HE RETURNS NEXT DAY OR SO FROM VISIT TO QATAR WHERE WE UNDERSTAND HE HAS GONE TO FINALIZE AGREEMENT ON CUSTOMS AND MINOR BORDER ISSUES.

2. EMBOFF HAS BEEN TOLD BY KAMAL ADHAM OF ONE INTERESTING PRELIMINARY TO KHALATBARI'S DISCUSSION WITH KING. SAQQAF WAS APPARENTLY QUITE CANDID WITH HIS IRANIAN COUNTERPART IN TELLING HIM BEFOREHAND THAT ISLANDS ISSUE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY COME UP IN AUDIENCE WITH KING BUT THAT SAQQAF STRONGLY HOPED KHALATBARI WOULD IN REPORTING TO SHAH DO HIS BEST MINIMIZE THIS ASPECT OF HIS DISCUSSIONS HERE. SAQQAF CLEARLY IMPLIED THAT WHILE KING CONTINUES FEEL STRONGLY ON MATTER OTHERS IN GOVT RECOGNIZE IT WOULD BE BETTER REGARD THIS ISSUE AS WATER OVER DAM AND CONCENTRATE ON AREAS OF GREATER MUTUAL AGREEMENT AND INTEREST. AT SAME TIME SAQQAF REMINDED KHALATBARI LIFE WOULD BE EASIER FOR SAUDIS IF SHAH COULD SEE SOME WAY MAKE GESTURE OF COMPENSATION AT LEAST TO RAS AL-KHAIMAH. A MILLION OR SO POUNDS BESTOWED ON RAS AL-KHAIMAH WOULD WRITE FINIS TO ISLANDS AFFAIR AND SAUDI ARABIA WOULD THEN BE IN MUCH STRONGER POSITION ENCOURAGE A REGIONAL APPROACH TO GULF SECURITY MATTERS. KHALATBARI INDICATED HE UNDERSTOOD.

3. I HAD OPPORTUNITY FOR HOUR'S MEETING WITH KHALATBARI JULY 3 AFTER HE HAD HAD COUPLE OF LONG TALKS WITH SAQQAF BUT BEFORE HE HAD SEEN KING, FAHD, OR SULTAN, AND WE WENT OVER MUCH OF SAME GROUND AMB HELMS HAD DISCUSSED WITH HIM (REFTELS). KHALATBARI EMPHASIZED SEVERAL TIMES THAT OF ALL THOUGHTS WE HAD SUGGESTED MOST IMPORTANT WAS REQUIREMENT ON IRANIAN PART FOR INEXHAUSTIBLE PATIENCE. I AGREED BUT SAID I WAS CONVINCED SAUDIS GENUINELY DESIRED COOPERATE WITH IRAN AND THAT THERE WERE GOOD OPPORTUNITIES FOR DOING SO.

4. REFERRING TO IRANIAN INTEREST IN DEVELOPING SOME SYSTEM FOR SECURITY COLLABORATION AMONG STATES OF REGION, KHALATBARI SEEMED TO FAVOR ALLOWING ARABS TO WORK UP AN ARRANGEMENT OF THEIR WON TO WHICH IRAN COULD LATER ADHERE.  
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HE RECOGNIZED, HOWEVER, THAT LACK OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA AND UAE COULD PREVENT ARABS FROM GETTING TOGETHER AMONG THEMSELVES.

5. I REVIEWED AGAIN CONCEPT THAT SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN SHOULD STRIVE TO DEVELOP PRACTICAL, TANGIBLE COOPERATIVE LINKS IN SUCH SPHERES AS ASSISTANCE FOR YAR AND FOR OMAN. BOTH IRAN AND SAG SEEK TO CONTROL DISTURBING ELEMENTS IN

GULF REGION. PRINCIPAL DISRUPTIVE IMPULSE EMANATES NOW FROM PDRY AS MANIFESTED THROUGH PRESSURE ON YAR, CONTINUANCE OF DHOFAR REBELLION AND SUBVERSIVE EFFORTS OF PFLOAG. IN THIS RESPECT SAUDIS ALREADY CARRYING IMPORTANT LOAD SINCE IT IS THEIR MONEY WHICH LARGELY PAYS SALARIES OF YAR CIVIL SERVICE AND ARMY AND REINFORCES STABILITY THERE. SAUDIS ARE GIVING THOUGHT TO AUGMENTING YAR MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING, AND LIKEWISE HAVE PROMISED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO OMAN, AS WELL AS SOME MODEST MILITARY HELP. ALL THESE REPRESENT SUBSTANTIAL CURRENT SAUDI CONTRIBUTIONS TO FENDING OFF THREAT TO GULF. I THOUGHT SAUDIS WOULD BE GLAD HAVE FURTHER IRANIAN HELP IN THESE ENDEAVORS.

6. MENTIONED ALSO I THOUGHT SAUDIS WOULD BE INTERESTED TO HEAR KHALATBARI'S ASSESSMENT OF IRAN'S OWN SECURITY PROBLEMS AND POLICIES. KHALATBARI SAID AT ONCE HE PLANNED EXPLAIN MOST CAREFULLY TO HIS HOSTS REASONS FOR IRAN'S REARMING WITH STRONG ASSURANCES THIS NOT AT ALL DIRECTED AGAINST FRIENDLY ARABS ALONG GULF'S SOUTHERN PERIMETER.

7. COMMENT: FOREGOING REFLECTS THAT AT OUTSET OF TALKS, AT LEAST, BOTH SIDES SEEMED DETERMINED TO BE FLEXIBLE AND TO SEEK ACCOMMODATION WITH ONE ANOTHER. THACHER

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